

Science of Logic

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel moves beyond the two-stage metacategorical structures of *Verstand/Vernunft* to a *three*-stage picture in which he rehearses, rationally reconstructs, recollects an expressive progression from

- i. initially crude metacategorical (so, *meta*-metaconceptual) structures (*Sein*, Being), immediacy.
- ii. through a less crude one (*Schein*, Essence, distinguishing necessity and possibility as the context in which actuality is understood, endorsement as essentially involving the possibility of error, reality/appearance), to
- iii. A final, potentially adequate one: *Begriff*.

Within each of these we find sub-cases, themselves increasing in expressive adequacy. As is the case with the recollective process that governs determinate empirical and practical, ground-level concepts, the progression through ever-more-expressively-adequate metacategorical discerns each latter stage as unpacking, making explicit some essential feature that is recollected as having been implicit in, presupposed by, the earlier stage.

The *circularity* he emphasizes is because the end of the process show up as identical in content to the starting point: what can now be seen to be *implicit* at the beginning is now made *explicit*.

This is two forms of one content (implicit and explicit):

an expressive hylomorphism, at the metacategorical, meta-metaconceptual level.

[These are the last 7 ‘graphs of the *Science of Logic*]

1. Consequently, just as the absence of content in the above beginnings does not make them absolute beginnings, so too it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress forwards or backwards. From one aspect, **the determinateness which the method creates for itself in its result is the moment by means of which the method is self-mediation and converts *the immediate beginning into something mediated***. But conversely, it is through the determinateness that this mediation of the method runs its course; **it returns *through a content* as through an apparent *other* of itself to its beginning in such a manner that not only does it restore that beginning-as a *determinate beginning* however-but the result is no less the sublated determinateness, and so too the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began**. This it accomplishes as *a system of totality*. We have still to consider it in this determination.

2. We have shown that the determinateness which was a result is itself, by virtue of the form of simplicity into which it has withdrawn, a fresh beginning; as this beginning is distinguished from its predecessor precisely by that determinateness, cognition rolls onwards from content to content. First of all, this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses, the succeeding ones becoming ever richer and more concrete. For the result contains its beginning and its course has enriched it by a fresh determinateness. The *universal* constitutes the foundation ; the advance is therefore not to be taken as a *flowing* from one *other* to the next *other* .In the absolute method the Notion maintains itself in its otherness, the universal in its particularization, in judgement and reality; at each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself.

3. This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is *communicated* to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it. But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side. The enrichment proceeds in the *necessity* of the Notion, it is held by it, and each determination is a reflection-into-self. Each new stage of *forthgoing*, that is, of *further determination*, is also a *withdrawal* inwards, and the greater *extension* is equally a *higher intensity*. The richest is therefore the most concrete and most *subjective*, and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth is the mightiest and most all-embracing. The highest, most concentrated point is the *pure personality* which, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less *embraces and holds everything within itself*, because it makes itself the supremely free-the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality.

4. It is in this manner that each step of the *advance* in the process of further determination, while getting further away from the indeterminate beginning is also *getting back nearer* to it, and that therefore, what at first sight may appear to be different, the retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the *progressive further determining* of it, coincide and are the same. The method, which thus winds itself into a circle, cannot anticipate its development in time that the beginning is, as such, already something *derived* ; it is sufficient for the beginning in its immediacy that it is simple universality...

5. By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a *circle* returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation ; this circle is moreover a *circle of circles*, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences [of logic, nature and spirit], each of which has an *antecedent* and a

successor-or, expressed more accurately, *has* only the *antecedent* and *indicates* its *successor* in its conclusion.

6. Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn into that same simple unity which its beginning is; the pure immediacy of being in which at first every determination appears to be extinguished or removed by abstraction, is the Idea that has reached through mediation, that is, through the sublation of mediation, a likeness correspondent to itself. **The method is the pure Notion that relates itself only to itself**; it is therefore the *simple self-relation* that is *being*. But now it is also *fulfilled being*, the *Notion that comprehends* itself, being as the *concrete* and also absolutely *intensive* totality. In conclusion, there remains only this to be said about this Idea, that in it, first, the *science of logic* has grasped its own Notion. In the sphere of *being*, the beginning of its *content*, its Notion appears as a knowing in a subjective reflection external to that content. But in the Idea of absolute cognition the Notion has become the Idea's own content. The Idea is itself the pure Notion that has itself for subject matter and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science [of logic], and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding its standing as content and subject matter and **cognizing the Notion of the science**. Secondly, this Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine *Notion*. True, the systematic exposition is itself a realization of the Idea but confined within the same sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the *urge* to sublimate this, and pure truth as the last result becomes also the *beginning of another sphere and science*. It only remains here to indicate this transition.

7. **The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute unity of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of being, is the totality in this form: nature.** But this determination has not *issued from a process of becoming*, nor is it a *transition*, as when above, the subjective Notion in its totality *becomes objectivity*, and the *subjective end becomes life*. On the contrary, **the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the Notion is itself raised into Notion, is an absolute liberation for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally posited and itself Notion**; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place; the simple being to which the Idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it and **is the Notion that, in its determination, abides with itself**. The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free-**the externality of space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity**. In so far as this externality presents itself only in the abstract immediacy of being and is apprehended from the standpoint of consciousness, it exists as mere

objectivity and external life; but in the Idea it remains essentially and actually [*an und für sich*] the totality of the Notion, and science in the relationship to nature of divine cognition. But in this next resolve of the pure Idea to determine itself as external Idea, it thereby **only** posits **for itself the mediation out of which the Notion ascends as a free Existence that has withdrawn into itself from externality**, that completes its self-liberation in the *science of spirit*, and that finds the supreme Notion of itself in **the science of logic as the self-comprehending pure Notion**.